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Abstract 
 
Crude Oil Pricing: The Role of Speculation in the Futures Market 
 
Michael Hall Yan, M.S. Stat 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Tom Shively 
 
This paper is intended to better understand the effects of speculation on crude oil 
prices.  While speculation has many benefits such as increasing market liquidity and 
bearing market risks that other wish to offset, speculation can also create unwanted 
market volatility and economic bubbles.  During the past decade, crude oil prices have 
been extremely volatile causing increased controversy between investors and regulators 
regarding the role that oil speculation has played in the price of crude oil.  This report 
examines the relationship between crude oil spot and futures prices to determine the role 
arbitragers, speculators, and hedgers have had in crude oil pricing.    
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INTRODUCTION 
In theory crude oil prices are affected by four distinct factors; consumer demand, 
consumer supply, government regulations, and financial markets.  However, recent 
controversy suggests that the financial markets have taken an overwhelming role in 
determining the price of crude oil.  There is a belief that the forces of supply and demand 
for oil are no longer responsible for the short-term pricing of crude oil.  Instead, the belief 
is that during the past few years the price of crude oil has been determined by oil 
speculators trading oil futures on the commodities exchange markets.  It has been 
suggested that oil speculation has created more volatility in crude oil prices.  This paper 
is designed to determine the short-term and long-term effects of oil speculation on the 
crude oil market. 
Futures Market Explanation 
The futures exchange market is an auction market where standardized and 
regulated futures contracts are traded.  The largest futures exchange in the world is the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which is regulated by The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC).  The CFTC is a United States Government Agency.  
A futures contract is a contractual agreement between two parties to buy or sell a 
financial instrument or commodity at a pre-determined price in the future.  A futures 
contract will specify the price for and quantity of the underlying asset to be delivered on 
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the settlement date.  Futures contracts are classified as derivatives, because they “derive” 
their value from an underlying asset, such as barrels of crude oil.  Some futures contracts 
require the physical delivery of an asset, while others are settled in cash.  The futures 
contracts settled in cash allow market participants to bet on asset 
appreciation/depreciation without ever physically owning the asset. 
MARKET PLAYERS 
There are three types of market participants who buy and sell futures based on 
their investment motives.  They are categorized as arbitragers, speculators and traders. 
Arbitragers 
Arbitragers are market participants who have no net assets or liabilities.  The 
arbitragers’ investment strategy is structured to generate a positive return while having no 
net investment.  If the strategy is implemented correctly, the arbitrager should bear no 
risk.  Arbitragers profit from price inefficiencies in the market by searching for price 
discrepancies between crude oil spot prices and futures prices.  Thus for arbitragers to be 
profitable, they would purchase the undervalued asset on one exchange and short the 
overvalued asset on another exchange until both the spot and future prices converged. 
Speculators 
Speculators are market participants who take an open position with respect to 
fluctuations in the market.  Speculators will buy or sell an asset based on the anticipated 
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price movement of that asset in the near future.  Speculators hope to make quick and 
large profits by taking on increased risks and correctly predicting the price of a specific 
asset.  To assume more risk and create higher potential profits, speculators use 
derivatives such as futures and options contracts to lever up their investments. 
Derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value from an underlying 
asset.  Derivatives are contracts between two parties that specify the conditions of the 
price and timing for the exchange of payment and underlying asset.  Derivatives are 
better known for their role in hedging risk.  However, speculators are able to use 
derivatives to acquire risk.  Speculators enter into derivative contracts taking the opposite 
position of market participants looking to hedge risk.  Speculators hope that traders 
looking to hedge their current position by seeking insurance are incorrect about the future 
value of the underlying asset.  For example, if a speculator believes that the future price 
of an underlying asset will be higher than the agreed upon futures price for the underlying 
asset, the speculator will profit by entering a futures contract that allows him to purchase 
the underlying asset at the lower price and then selling the underlying asset on the market 
at the higher price. 
Derivatives are used to bear more risk because they allow speculators to increase 
the leverage in their investments.  With the use of derivatives, speculators are able to hold 
larger investments with the same amount of initial capital.  In some cases, such as oil 
speculation, the speculator requires minimal to no initial capital (stated within the 
contract) to enter into a futures a contract.  Thus, derivatives allow speculators to make 
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profits that are unattainable by the common investor, but on the other hand, losses of the 
same magnitude are also possible.  Needless to say, speculators do not have offsetting 
assets or liabilities, since they maximize profit as well as risk. 
Traders 
Traders, also known as hedgers, are involved in the futures market.  Hedgers 
make offsetting investments to reduce the risk of a specific asset from adverse price 
fluctuations.  Crude oil traders include producers, distributors, and end users.  Normally 
an offsetting position is taken with the use of futures contracts.  For example, many 
businesses dealing with crude oil use futures contracts to lock in an agreed upon price to 
buy or sell crude oil for the foreseeable future which reduces much of the volatility of 
crude oil prices.  Reducing volatility in input or output resources helps businesses plan 
for the future and avoid disruptions in workflow.  The demand from traders is mainly 
affected by the futures price, which is used as a proxy for the future price of the 
underlying asset. 
Explaining Oil Speculation 
Crude oil, like any commodity, is traded in the commodities market.  Commodity 
markets create the opportunity for oil speculation.  Oil speculation uses oil futures, 
contracts between an oil purchaser and seller to exchange oil at a set price and date in the 
future.  Oil futures allow for speculators to bet on whether the price of crude oil will 
increase or decrease without ever actually possessing the physical barrels of oil.   
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Oil speculation has its benefits in the crude oil market.  By bearing market risk 
that other market participants wish to offset, speculation increases market liquidity and 
closes the gap between the bid-ask spread. Without speculation the market would become 
illiquid, making it difficult for hedgers to offset their risks associated with crude oil.  The 
value of the crude oil futures that hedgers are asking for could be much higher than the 
value that bidders are offering.  Sometimes the market could become so illiquid that there 
are no bidders at all to take the offsetting position hedgers are looking for.   
However, there are disadvantages associated with speculation.  They include 
increased market volatility and economic bubbles and bursts.  Very volatile crude oil 
markets cause volatile oil and gasoline prices.  Volatile prices can cause problems for the 
economy.  Since oil and gasoline are used as inputs in many businesses in the form of 
transportation, volatile oil and gasoline prices can cause result in poor business 
forecasting and planning, which can disrupt business operations.  Another controversial 
issue currently being debated is that oil speculation is the main driving factor of rising 
gas prices.  Many believe that gas prices are rising to record highs as a result of oil 
speculation and are no longer controlled by gasoline supply and demand. 
In theory, the effect that oil speculation has on crude oil prices is very significant.  
We provide an illustration of oil speculation dominating crude oil and gasoline prices. If 
speculators believe the price of oil will rise dramatically, then the demand for crude oil 
futures will rise.  A higher demand for futures signals that the futures are undervalued 
and results in higher futures prices.  Rising futures prices signals to oil producers that 
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demand for crude oil is rising, which causes higher prices per barrel of oil.  Finally, the 
increase in crude oil prices per barrel reassures the speculator of his belief that oil prices 
are rising and further fuels the cycle.  Another adverse effect of this rise of oil futures 
prices caused by speculation is portrayed by oil suppliers hoarding oil into reserves to sell 
at a later date when the market price of oil is in their favor.  Suppliers hoarding oil 
reduces supply and fuels the cycle by further increasing oil prices. 
Due this recent controversy regarding the spikes in crude oil prices, the CFTC has 
been monitoring and intervening in the crude oil futures market to attempt to decrease the 
amount of volatility in pricing crude oil.  This study will examine the effects of oil 
speculation on crude oil and gasoline prices and determine if intervention in the futures 
market is necessary for more stable oil prices. 
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STATISTICAL MODELING 
Arbitrage Futures Price 
First we define  as the arbitrage futures price, the futures price if only 
arbitragers participated in the futures market.  The arbitrage futures price is defined as the 
current spot price ( ) plus the added costs of storing the crude oil before selling the 
crude oil.  There are two types of costs for storing crude oil, the physical real cost of 
carry ( ) and the financial cost of carry ( .1   Therefore we arrive at the arbitrage 
futures equation. 
  Eq. 1 
Thinking about this conceptually, the sum of , , and  is equivalent to the 
sum of the spot price multiplied by (1 + real cost of carry rate) and spot price multiplied 
by (1 + financial cost of carry rate).  We proxy (1 + the real cost of carry rate) with   
 where  is the inflation rate of the past month and  is the 90 day 
interest rate.  We also proxy (1 + financial cost of carry rate) with  where  is 
once again the 90 day interest rate. Thus,  represents the spot price 
multiplied by (1 + real cost of carry rate) and  represents the spot price 
multiplied by (1 + financial cost of carry rate).  Therefore,  is defined as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Moosa (1995, pp.168-170). Arbitrage opportunities present themselves when the cost of the physical 
barrel of oil and carrying costs are different from the futures price. 
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  Eq. 2 
LIBOR is the proxy for  as the 90 day interest rate.  The three month forward 
inflation rate is calculated using  where  is the current OECD 
Consumer Price Index and  is the previous OECD Consumer Price Index.  Therefore, 
the arbitrage futures price   is determined by the current spot price , the OECD 
Consumer Price Index , and LIBOR  . 
Expected Spot Price 
Next we define  as the expected spot price three months in the future.  
However, this expected spot price will vary greatly from market participant to market 
participant.  Therefore,  will not be a reliable variable for our research purposes.  For 
our study, we redefine  in terms of , the actual spot price three months in the 
future.  Since we are trying to determine whether oil speculation has occurred in the past, 
historic spot price data will suffice for . 
We begin be defining  as the expectation of the spot price in three months, 
given all the available information in the market at time t, .  This gives us the following 
expression. 
 Eq. 3 
The expected value operator E refers to the actual distribution, given information 
 available at time period t.  Then by the nature of conditional expectations we have 
  Eq. 4 
9 
 
where  is stochastic disturbance with mean zero and is uncorrelated with  and thus the 
variables that actually generate spot prices.2   Thus by substitution we arrive at 
 and rearranging terms leads to the expected spot price in Eq. 5. 
 Eq. 5 
Actual Futures Price 
Now that we have defined  and , we continue to derive an expression for the 
actual futures price ( ), which will represent our model.  In order to understand the 
assumptions behind the model, we start by defining equilibrium with all the players 
(arbitragers, speculators, traders) involved. 
ARBITRAGERS’ EXCESS DEMAND 
In order to define arbitragers’ excess demand, it is important to understand the 
factors driving it.  It is assumed that as the delivery month of the oil future approaches, 
the future’s price will get closer to the spot price, and on the delivery date the futures 
price will equal the spot price.  This assumption is upheld because arbitrage traders will 
take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity between futures and spot prices until the 
arbitrage opportunity disappears and equilibrium between futures and spot prices is 
reached.  For example, suppose oil futures are priced higher than spot prices days before 
                                                 
2 McCallum (1977, pp.147-148).  McCallum defines the nature of conditional expectations.  His definition 
states that the nature of conditional expectations implies that the stochastic "disturbance" , defined by 
 has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the variables comprising , the variables 
that actually generate spot prices. Thus, the rationality assumption permits us to write  
with  and to assume that  will be uncorrelated with each variable that appears in the list . 
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the delivery date.  Arbitrage traders will make a profit by shorting futures contracts, 
buying crude oil, and delivering the crude oil.  By shorting futures, arbitragers are 
increasing the supply of oil futures thus dropping futures prices. Also, by purchasing 
crude oil, arbitragers increase demand for crude oil thus increasing spot prices.  By 
simultaneously buying and selling in both markets, arbitragers are able to protect 
themselves against any chance of profit or loss from the actual fluctuation of crude oil 
spot or futures prices.  Arbitragers’ excess demand for futures is expressed as the 
following.3 
 Eq. 6 
SPECULATORS’ EXCESS DEMAND  
Speculators’ demand is driven by the possible profit that comes from the 
fluctuations in crude oil spot and futures prices.  The basic concept is that the speculator 
analyses crude oil spot prices and forecasts the expected spot price for some time in the 
future, .  Using the difference between the estimate for the future spot price, , 
and the current futures price for crude oil with a settlement date of , the speculator 
hopes to generate a profit.  The expected profit equals the positive difference between 
and  which is represented by the following.  
  Eq. 7 
                                                 
3 Officer and Willett (1970).  α is finite for any of several possible reasons in the covered arbitrage 
schedule defined by Officer and Willett. 
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However, the speculator assumes risk, which is defined by the possibility of an 
inaccurate estimate of the future spot price.  Therefore, when  the speculator 
will buy and hold crude oil at the current spot price, , and sell futures because the price 
of crude oil is expected to rise and rise above the current futures prices for time .  On 
the other hand, when  the speculator will sell crude oil at the current spot price 
and purchase futures because the price of crude oil is expected to drop and drop below 
the current futures price for time .  Thus, speculators’ excess demand for futures is 
expressed as the following. 
 Eq. 8 
TRADERS’ EXCESS DEMAND 
Many models adopt the convention that traders are classified as either arbitragers 
or speculators.  This concept originated with Stoll in 1968, and leads to a model that only 
considers arbitragers and speculators effect on prices.  Stoll argues that the current flow 
of trade and payments has not and will not be considered, because our study is focused on 
crude oil futures markets and not the balance of payments.  Our study only inquires about 
the relationship of the futures rate and spot rate.  Stoll goes on to mention that the 
operations of international traders do not go unconsidered.  He mentions that traders 
operating in the futures market are considered as either arbitragers or speculators, as long 
as they extend or receive short-term financing.4   Suppose an oil consumer, such as an 
                                                 
4 Stoll (1968, pp. 61).  Stoll’s argument is in the context of the forward exchange market.  This theory can 
be easily applied to any asset in a futures exchange market. 
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airline, will need 60 million barrels of oil in the upcoming year.  If the airline protects 
itself against the danger that the price of oil will increase by entering into futures 
contracts, which locks the price the airline will pay per barrel, then the airline is acting 
like an arbitrager.  If the airline does nothing, it has a net asset denominated in crude oil, 
which is speculation.  The same process occurs for an oil supplier, just in the opposite 
direction.  Traders are considered arbitragers or speculators based on whether or not the 
trader hedges their risk, which ensures a smaller guaranteed profit, or does nothing, 
which creates the possibility or a larger profit and larger amount of risk. 
While this approach is widely accepted, there have been some arguments against 
categorizing hedgers as either arbitragers or speculators.  The strongest argument against 
this approach comes from Sho-Chieh Tsiang in his 1959 study, “The Theory of Forward 
Exchange.”  Tsiang argues that another independent variable is needed to represent the 
risk in existing traders’ contracts of shorter maturity.  His reasoning is that if past forward 
commitments have all been in one direction, the speculator will have accumulated a 
significant amount of risk and will become reluctant to make further forward 
commitments in that same direction.  Therefore, some of the traders Stoll categorized as 
speculators are actually in their own group of market participants.5   However, Stoll 
argues that the independent variable for traders is unnecessary in the model, because it is 
assumed that at any moment in time the speculator is always in equilibrium with respect 
to all maturities. For example, if he believes that his past futures commitments are too 
                                                 
5 See Tsiang (1959, pp. 92-94). 
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great, he can simply buy futures for the current maturity of those contracts to reverse 
prior commitments.  Whether or not the speculator maintains his prior commitments will 
depend on the spread between the current futures rate and his expected future spot price 
for a specific time commitment and maturity date.6   Thus, we will treat traders as either 
arbitragers or speculators in our model. 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
If all futures market activity is attributed only to arbitragers and speculators, then 
the market clearing condition where equilibrium is reached by the laws of supply and 
demand is represented by the following. 
 Eq. 9 
Using   from Eq. 6 and  from Eq. 8, we 
derive, , and   as coefficients representing arbitragers’ and speculators’ effect 
on the futures price of a barrel of crude oil, respectively. 
Derivation 
 
 
 
 Eq. 10 
                                                 
6 Stoll (1968, pp. 61).  The position and risk that the speculator has taken in other maturities (in our case, 
all maturities other than three months) will have no effect on these specific (three month) prior 
commitments. 
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By replacing  and   with constants  and  respectively, we arrive 
at the equation where  is our intercept,  indicates the 
importance of arbitrage on futures prices, and indicates the importance of speculation 
on futures prices.  Finally, we use Eq. 5 and substitute -  for   to arrive at the 
following equation. 
 Eq. 11 
 
 with  Eq. 127 
  
                                                 
7 McCallum (1977, pp.147-148).  It has been noted that , and by the linearity property of the 
expected value operator, .  Therefore, our error term should still have 
mean 0.  It has also been noted that  is uncorrelated with each variable that appears in the list .  
Multiplying   by  does not change the fact that it is still uncorrelated with each variable that appears 
in the list . 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Time Series Data 
Once the data have been collected and the arbitrage futures price is calculated we 
continue to analyze our model.  Since most asset prices are considered time series data 
and crude oil prices fall into this category, we first check our variables for correlation 
with time.  It is easily determined that all our variables: futures price, spot price, arbitrage 
futures price, interest rate, and consumer price index are correlated through time.  Figure 
1 and Figure 2 show the correlation between WTI Crude Oil Prices and Time.  Figure 3 
and Figure 4 show the correlation between Brent Crude Oil Prices and Time.  
16 
 
Figure 1: WTI Crude Oil Prices ($) vs. Time 
 
Figure 2: WTI Crude Oil Residuals Vs Time 
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Figure 3: Brent Crude Oil Price ($) Vs. Time 
 
Figure 4: Brent Crude Oil Residuals Vs. Time
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NON-STATIONARY VS. STATIONARY VARIABLES 
The problem that arises with time series data is that when data are correlated with 
time, the data are usually non-stationary.  Non-stationary data means that the variable(s) 
has no clear tendency to return to a constant value or a linear trend.  Non-stationary 
variables are different from stationary variables, since stationary variables return to a 
fixed value or fluctuate around a linear trend, thus making the deviations from the trend 
stationary.  In simpler terms, being stationary means that the mean and variance are 
constant over time. 
Non-stationary variables cannot be analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
because OLS is structured to estimate parameters for stationary variables.  For example, 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the slope coefficients of the 
autoregressive model which relies on stochastic process being stationary. However, when 
the stochastic process is non-stationary, the use of OLS can produce invalid estimates. In 
the famous 1974 paper on spurious regression, Granger and Newbold deemed results 
from spurious regressions unreliable.8   Spurious regression results often have high R
2
 
values, small standard errors, and inflated t-ratios; however the results yield no economic 
meaning. 
                                                 
8 Granger and Newbold (1974 pp.117). This paper led to a re-evaluation of previous empirical work in 
econometric methodology.  Granger and Newbold came to the conclusion that if a regression equation 
relating economic variables is found to have strongly auto-correlated residuals, then the only conclusion 
that can be reached is that the equation is mis-specified, regardless of the value of R
2
 that is observed.  
Prior to this study being published, economists used results from regressions on auto-correlated data, which 
provided unreliable results. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
To determine whether or not variables are stationary or non-stationary, we apply 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF).  The ADF tests the null hypothesis of the 
variable having a unit root.  When a variable has a unit root, it means that the variable is 
non-stationary.  On the other hand, if the variable does not have a unit root, it means that 
the variable is stationary.  Thus, the test looks at the following.9  
H0: Non stationary (Has unit root) 
HA: Stationary (No unit root) 
After performing the ADF Test on our variables, Ft, , and St+3, realize that the 
unit root is not rejected and that the variables are non-stationary.  Since our series are 
non-stationary, we cannot estimate parameter values using OLS.  However, if we 
transform each series by taking the first and second differences and either the first or 
second differenced series is stationary, we can then proceed to build an error correction 
model and run an OLS regression.  We repeat the ADF Test on the first and second 
differences of the variables and observe that either the first or second differences are in 
fact stationary (has no unit root).  When a series is non-stationary, but its first difference 
is stationary, the series is consider to be integrated at order one, I(1).  If a series and its 
first difference are both non-stationary, but its second difference is stationary, then the 
series is consider to be integrated at order two, I(2), and so forth.  Therefore, the data 
series for some of the time periods are I(1) and the data series for other time periods are 
                                                 
9 See Dickey and Fuller (1981 pp.1057-72) for the derivation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. 
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I(2).  Thus, instead of using yt as a dependent variable, the dependent variable becomes 
 for series that are I(1), and  for 
series that are I(2). 
Integrated Series Data 
All integrated series are non-stationary.  Integrated time series data appear to be 
on a ‘random walk’, which means that the best predictor of the series at time t is the value 
from the previous period t-1.  This poses a problem for regression analysis because these 
integrated time series are permanently affected by shocks, not mean-reverting, and 
theoretically have no mean and an infinite variance.  Fortunately, there are methods 
available to deal with integrated series analyses. 
ENGLE AND GRANGER TWO-STEP ERROR CORRECTION MODEL (ECM) 
In order to analyze an integrated series, we need to apply equilibrium theories 
which will require a linear combination of our variables to be stationary. Otherwise, any 
deviation from equilibrium will not be temporary.  Engle and Granger recommend a two-
step procedure, named the Engle and Granger Two-Step Error Correction Model.  The 
first step is to estimate the long-run (equilibrium) equation.  The second step is to 
estimate the error correction model.10 
                                                 
10 Phillips (1957, pp. 276-77).  Phillips defines ECM as a method of adjusting a policy instrument to 
maintain a target variable close to its desired value. 
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Co-integration 
In order to estimate the long-term (equilibrium) equation, we must first conclude 
that co-integration exists between our series of data.  Co-integration is defined as two or 
more series that are individually integrated but some linear combination of them has a 
lower order of integration.  If this assumption holds then the series are said to be co-
integrated.  For example, if we have two non-stationary time series X and Y that become 
stationary when differenced such that some linear combination of X and Y is stationary, 
then X and Y are co-integrated.  This means that while neither X nor does Y alone hover 
around a constant value, a linear combination of them does.  Thus, co-integration states 
that X and Y have some type of long-run equilibrium relationship.  A practical example 
would be between series of income and consumption data, because as income increases 
or decreases, consumption does as well.  In our example, if a linear combination of our 
three series are stationary then we have co-integration.  This means that each series 
wanders through time, but the three series wander within close proximity of one another.  
If co-integration exists between Ft, , and St+3 at I(1) or I(2) then it states that the linear 
combination of the variables are stationary.  Thus, we can proceed to the second step of 
the Engle and Granger ECM. 
Testing for Co-integration 
We have already derived the long-term equilibrium equation in Eq. 12 and wish to 
continue with the first step in the Engle-Granger procedure by confirming co-integration 
exists between the Futures, Arbitrage Futures, and Spot series.  We use ordinary least 
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squares (OLS) regression on Eq. 12, , to estimate the 
parameters , , and .  Using these parameter estimates and Eq. 12, we solve for the 
predicted futures price.  Then we can solve for the non-stationary series error in our 
model by subtracting the predicted futures price from the actual futures price (Error = 
Futures – Predicted Futures).  The error term is defined as follows. 
 Eq. 13 
Then we proceed to another ADF test on the error term.  If the series of residuals 
is stationary (has no unit root) then our series of data are said to be co-integrated.  If the 
ADF test fails to reject the null hypothesis of our series being non-stationary, which will 
occur if any of the three series is I(2).  Then we must repeat this process for the second 
difference and again test to see if the residuals are stationary.  Our results indicate that the 
residuals are stationary for all time periods of data at either the first or second difference.  
Table 1 shows that the null hypotheses stating our series are non-stationary are all 
significantly rejected at their appropriate order of integration by the ADF Test.11 
  
                                                 
11 Note that the OLS regression run on Eq. 12 does not produce any meaningful results since all the 
variables in that equation are of I(1).  OLS is only used to determine if the residuals are stationary and thus 
co-integrated. 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test 
WTI Crude Oil   Brent Crude Oil 
1986-1990   1986-1990 
Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value   Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures Price -1.10 0.2755   Arbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
Spot Price -0.54 0.5885   Spot Price N/A N/A 
Futures Price -0.70 0.4886   Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔArbitrage Futures Price 3.80 0.0004   ΔArbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔSpot Price 3.81 0.0004   ΔSpot Price N/A N/A 
ΔFutures Price 4.63 0.0001   ΔFutures Price N/A N/A 
Error Correction Term -3.26 0.0021   Error Correction Term N/A N/A 
1991-1995   1991-1995 
Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value   Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures Price -1.89 0.0649   Arbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
Spot Price -1.28 0.2084   Spot Price N/A N/A 
Futures Price -1.54 0.1311   Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔArbitrage Futures Price 2.84 0.0066   ΔArbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔSpot Price 2.66 0.0106   ΔSpot Price N/A N/A 
ΔFutures Price 2.50 0.0159   ΔFutures Price N/A N/A 
Error Correction Term -3.15 0.0028   Error Correction Term N/A N/A 
1996-2000   1996-2000 
Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value   Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures Price -1.46 0.1517   Arbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
Spot Price -1.54 0.1302   Spot Price N/A N/A 
Futures Price -1.46 0.1504   Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔArbitrage Futures Price -0.20 0.8432   ΔArbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
ΔSpot Price 0.83 0.4126   ΔSpot Price N/A N/A 
ΔFutures Price 0.64 0.5282   ΔFutures Price N/A N/A 
Δ^2 Arbitrage Futures Price 5.53 0.0001   Δ^2 Arbitrage Futures Price N/A N/A 
Δ^2 Spot Price 6.37 0.0001   Δ^2 Spot Price N/A N/A 
Δ^2 Futures Price 5.60 0.0001   Δ^2 Futures Price N/A N/A 
Error Correction Term -2.92 0.0054   Error Correction Term N/A N/A 
2001-2005   1998-2005 
Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value   Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures Price -0.02 0.9819   Arbitrage Futures Price -0.41 0.6810 
Spot Price 0.21 0.8332   Spot Price 0.15 0.8826 
Futures Price 0.22 0.8259   Futures Price -0.43 0.6696 
ΔArbitrage Futures Price 0.24 0.8108   ΔArbitrage Futures Price -0.30 0.7658 
ΔSpot Price 0.82 0.4171   ΔSpot Price -0.52 0.6038 
ΔFutures Price 0.98 0.3297   ΔFutures Price 2.25 0.0274 
Δ^2 Arbitrage Futures Price 4.67 0.0001   Δ^2 Arbitrage Futures Price 5.60 0.0001 
Δ^2 Spot Price 4.66 0.0001   Δ^2 Spot Price 5.32 0.0001 
Δ^2 Futures Price 5.23 0.0001   Δ^2 Futures Price 8.10 0.0001 
Error Correction Term -4.01 0.0002   Error Correction Term -3.05 0.0030 
2006-2011   2006-2011 
Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value   Variable ADF Test Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures Price -2.44 0.0181   Arbitrage Futures Price -1.78 0.0808 
Spot Price -2.25 0.0282   Spot Price -2.07 0.0427 
Futures Price -2.32 0.0241   Futures Price -1.73 0.0886 
ΔArbitrage Futures Price 2.85 0.0061   ΔArbitrage Futures Price 3.21 0.0022 
ΔSpot Price 3.54 0.0008   ΔSpot Price 3.36 0.0014 
ΔFutures Price 3.79 0.0004   ΔFutures Price 6.30 0.0001 
Error Correction Term -3.14 0.0028   Error Correction Term -1.93 0.0581 
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Phillips-Ouliaris Test for Co-integration 
Since the ECM depends entirely on the series data being co-integrated, we will 
also run the Phillips-Ouliaris to ensure that we did not make an error while solving for the 
residuals or using the ADF test for co-integration.  The Phillips-Ouliaris Test for co-
integration has the null hypothesis of no co-integration between all the series.  Thus, if 
the test rejects the null hypothesis then we have co-integration and can continue with the 
Engle-Granger Two-Step ECM analysis.  We run the Phillips-Ouliaris test on the spot, 
arbitrage futures, and futures prices.  The results are presented by time frame in Table 2.12 
Table 2: Phillip-Ouliaris Test 
 
WTI Crude Oil 
 
Brent Crude Oil 
 
 
Time Frame PO Test Statistic 
 
Time Frame PO Test Statistic 
 
 
1986-1990 54.448 
 
1998-2005 93.9675 
 
 
1991-1995 57.1081 
 
2006-2011 77.8968 
 
 
1996-2000 44.0797 
 
1998-2011 (ALL) 162.5419 
 
 
2001-2005 75.1748 
    
 
2006-2011 41.4256 
    
 
1986-1995 94.8413 
    
 
1991-2000 86.9327 
    
 
1996-2005 84.3987 
 
Test Statistic Critical Values 
 
 
2001-2011 79.8948 
 
Cutoff Critical values 
 
 
1986-2000 136.1513 
 
10% 62.1436 
 
 
1991-2005 128.5179 
 
5% 71.2751 
 
 
2001-2011 112.9916 
 
1% 89.6679 
 
 
1986-2005 165.8795 
    
 
1991-2011 140.3539 
    
 
1986-2011 (ALL) 173.7575 
     
These results reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration.  The initial tests on 
our WTI Crude Oil time periods (1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2000-2005, 2006-
                                                 
12 The data for Brent Crude Oil futures are not available prior to 1998.  Brent Crude Oil futures first started 
trading in 1998 on the International Petroleum Exchange in London.  Since 2005 Brent Crude Oil Futures 
were traded on the electronic InterContinental Exchange (ICE).  Today Brent Crude Oil Futures are also 
traded on the NYMEX. 
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2011) do not have enough statistical power to reject H0.  However, the Phillip-Ouliaris 
test shows that as length of time increases, the statistical power to reject the null 
hypothesis becomes stronger.  From this we infer that there is not enough series data in 
our initial time frames for the Phillip-Ouliaris test to reject the null hypothesis at a 
statistically significant level.  In simpler terms, it is possible that while co-integration 
may be present the test cannot detect the alternative hypothesis of co-integration with 
such limited amount of data.  Therefore, by extending our time frames we see that the 
null hypothesis is rejected and that co-integration exists between the three series.  With 
this statistical evidence from the longer time frames, we can arrive at the assumption that 
co-integration exists in our initial time frames, just not detected by Phillip-Ouliaris.  This 
logic is correct because if the series are co-integrated then the deviations from an 
equilibrium relationship will be corrected over time.  Therefore, the Phillip-Ouliaris and 
the ADF tests performed on the residuals agree that co-integration is present within the 
series of data. 
Estimating the Error Correction Model (ECM) 
Once co-integration has been proved, we use an error correction model (ECM) to 
estimate the short-term and long-term effects of arbitragers and speculators on futures 
prices.  Engle and Granger stated in their 1987 paper that if a set of variables are co-
integrated, then there exists a valid error correction representation of the data, and vice 
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versa.1314  Error correction models are time series models that estimate the speed at which 
a dependent variable, Y, returns to equilibrium after a change in an independent variable, 
X.  ECMs are extremely useful models when dealing with integrated data in time series 
models.  The basic structure of an ECM is given by the following. 
–  Eq. 14 
EC is the error correction component of the model and measures the speed at which prior 
deviations from equilibrium are corrected. 
Our residuals from the co-integrating regression capture deviations from the 
equilibrium of , , and .  Therefore, we can estimate both the short-term and 
long-term effects of  and  on  by including the lagged residuals from the co-
integrating regression as our measure of the error correction mechanism.  By doing so, 
we arrive at ECM equations with all variables I(0) and stationary.  Eq. 15 represents the 
first difference ECM and Eq. 16 represents the second difference ECM. 
 Eq. 15 
 Eq. 16 
                                                 
13 Granger (1981, pp.121-130). Granger first pointed out the relationship between error correction models 
and co-integration in his 1981 paper, “Some Properties of Time Series Data and Their Use in Econometric 
Model Specification.”   
14 Engle and Granger (1987, pp.251-276). Granger originally stated and proved a theorem (in an 
unpublished paper in 1983) that showed precisely that co-integrated series can be represented by error 
correction models.  This theorem was later published in 1987 and called the Granger Representation 
Theorem. 
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Checking the Model Assumptions 
Before conducting regression analyses on the ECMs, there are four assumptions 
for each ECM that must be checked.  The assumptions for OLS regression analysis are: 
linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables, independence 
of the errors (no serial correlation), homoscedasticity (constant variance) of the errors 
against the predictions and against time, and normality in the error distributions.  Figure 5 
and Figure 6 plot the residuals (error terms) against the predictions and time respectively.  
Together, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that the error terms are not correlated and do not 
have any specific patterns.  Thus we can conclude independent error terms and 
homoscedasticity.  Figure 5 also confirms that the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables is linear, because again the plots show a random scatter about 0.  
Figure 7 is a QQ plot which checks for normality in the error distributions.  If the 
scatterplots follow the QQ diagonal line, then we have normal error terms.  Figure 7 
confirms that the error terms are distributed normally.   
In addition to the QQ plot, we perform the following four diagnostic tests; the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Cramer-Von Mises test, and Anderson-
Darling test.15  The null hypothesis for these tests is that the assumption of normality is 
appropriate (H0: Normality Holds).  Therefore, the evidence suggests the normality 
assumption holds if we fail to reject H0.  Table 3 shows that all the p-values are greater 
                                                 
15 The tests for normality of the model’s error terms are performed with the statistical software SAS. 
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than 0.05, suggesting that we fail to reject H0 and the normality assumption holds.  These 
results agree with our QQ plots. 
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Figure 5: Checking for Linearity with Residuals Vs. Predicted Graphs 
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Figure 5 (Continued): Checking for Linearity with Residuals Vs. Predicted Graphs 
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Figure 6: Checking for Error Term Independence and Constant Variance  
with Residuals vs. Time Graphs 
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Figure 6 (Continued): Checking for Error Term Independence and Constant Variance with Residuals vs. Time Graphs 
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Figure 7: Checking for Normality with QQ Plot 
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Figure 7 (Continued): Checking for Normality with QQ Plot 
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Table 3: Tests for Normality 
 
   
 
1986-1990 WTI Crude Oil 
 
1998-2005 Brent Crude Oil 
 
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
 
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9663 0.1010 
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9896 0.7263 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0932 0.1500 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0582 0.1500 
 
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0790 0.2165 
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0378 0.2500 
 
 
Anderson-Darling      0.6211 0.1011 
 
Anderson-Darling      0.2508 0.2500 
 
 
1991-1995 WTI Crude Oil 
 
2006-2011 Brent Crude Oil 
 
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
 
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9719 0.2063 
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9823 0.3888 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0803 0.1500 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0875 0.1500 
 
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0878 0.1643 
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0974 0.1228 
 
 
Anderson-Darling      0.5104 0.1978 
 
Anderson-Darling      0.5259 0.1825 
 
 
1996-2000 WTI Crude Oil 
     
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
     
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9884 0.8676 
     
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0657 0.1500 
     
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0380 0.2500 
     
 
Anderson-Darling      0.2533 0.2500 
     
 
2001-2005 WTI Crude Oil 
     
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
     
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9611 0.0603 
     
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0977 0.1500 
     
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0964 0.1262 
     
 
Anderson-Darling      0.6152 0.1053 
     
 
2006-2011 WTI Crude Oil 
     
 
Test Statistic P-Value 
     
 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9788 0.3099 
     
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    0.0816 0.1500 
     
 
Cramer-von Mises       0.0818 0.2003 
     
 
Anderson-Darling      0.5093 0.2003 
     
         
Checking the Model Restrictions 
The constraints placed on the model include that  and  are both positive and 
sum to one.  Intuitively,  and  must both be positive.   and  must also sum to 1 
because it has already been assumed that the only participants in the market are 
arbitragers and speculators. 
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;  
    
We first test the restriction  on all the WTI Crude Oil ECM data 
combined.  We test the null hypothesis, H0: , against the alternative 
hypothesis, HA: .   The restriction on the WTI Crude Oil ECM has a t-
statistic and p-value of -1.01 and 0.3146 respectively.  Thus, we fail to reject H0: 
. 
Then we test the same restriction  with H0:  against 
HA:  on all our Brent Crude Oil ECM data combined.  The restriction on the 
Brent Crude Oil ECM has a t-statistic and p-value of -0.74 and 0.4631 respectively.  
Thus, we also fail to reject H0:  for our Brent Crude Oil ECM data. 
Next we wish to test the restrictions  and . Table 4 and Table 5 
show the results for testing H0:  against HA:  and H0:  against HA: 
.  The t-statistics and p-values significantly reject H0 in favor of HA.  Therefore, 
we draw the conclusion that  and .  To determine whether  and 
 we closely examine the t-statistics.  If the t-statistics are positive and greater than 
two, suggesting that H0 is strongly rejected, then we can conclude that  and
.  By examine our t-statistics in Table 4 and Table 5 we confirm that  and .  
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Table 4: Testing Restrictions: WTI Crude Oil 
1986-1990 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 44.85 <.0001 
Spot 7.36 <.0001 
1991-1995 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 29.8 <.0001 
Spot 4.32 <.0001 
1996-2000 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 18.7   <.0001 
Spot 5.02   <.0001 
2001-2005 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 34.12  <.0001 
Spot 4.06 0.0002 
2006-2011 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 44.01  <.0001 
Spot 2.59 0.012 
 
Table 5: Testing Restrictions: Brent Crude Oil 
   
1998-2005 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 34.57  <.0001 
Spot 8.66    <.0001 
2006-2011 
Series T-Stat P-Value 
Arb Futures 28.65  <.0001 
Spot 2.29 0.0253 
   
Testing the Model 
Now that all the assumptions and restrictions have been checked and all the 
variables are stationary, a static regression analysis can be performed using the error 
correction model.  Table 6 and Table 7 show the estimates for the parameters, β1, β2, and 
β3.  β1 represents the short-term effect that arbitragers have on deviations from long-term 
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equilibrium.  β2 represents the short-term effect that speculators have on deviations from 
long-term equilibrium.  β3 represents the error correction parameter. 
The error correction term accounts for the short-term variability in and St+3 and 
the error correction parameter gives the rate at which the model re-equilibrates, i.e. the 
speed at which it returns to its equilibrium level.  In order words, the error correction 
parameter tells us the proportion of the disequilibrium which is corrected with each 
passing period. This coefficient should be negative and less than the absolute value of 
one indicating its re-equilibrating properties.  If the error correction parameter is 0, then 
the process never re-equilibrates and if it equals -1, then re-equilibration occurs in one 
period.  However, if values of β3 turn out to be greater than zero, the conclusion is that 
the series over time diverge from the long-run equilibrium and thus the ECM model is 
invalid.  We see that our error correction parameters β3 are all between -1 and 0 from 
Table 6 and Table 7. 
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Table 6: WTI Crude Oil Results 
1986-1990 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.858963 0.0192 44.85 <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.141037 0.0192 7.36 <.0001 
Error Correction (β3) -0.05649 0.0132 -4.26 <.0001 
1991-1995 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.87328 0.0293 29.8 <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.12672 0.0293 4.32 <.0001 
Error Correction (β3) -0.00809 0.0244 0.33 0.7415 
1996-2000 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.788441 0.0422 18.7   <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.211559 0.0422 5.02   <.0001 
Error Correction (β3 + β4) -0.232028       
     Error Correction at Δ (β3) -0.26596 0.0627 -4.24   <.0001 
     Error Correction at Δ2 (β4) 0.033932 0.0173 1.96 0.0546 
2001-2005 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.89367 0.0262 34.12  <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.10633 0.0262 4.06 0.0002 
Error Correction (β3 + β4) -0.86425       
     Error Correction at Δ (β3) 0.09821 0.0315 -3.12 0.0029 
     Error Correction at Δ2 (β4) -0.96246 0.1839 -5.23  <.0001 
2006-2011 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.944485 0.0215 44.01  <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.055515 0.0215 2.59 0.012 
Error Correction at Δ (β3) -0.02998 0.0118 -2.55 0.0133 
          
 
Table 7: Brent Crude Oil Results 
1998-2005 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.799596 0.0231 34.57  <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.200404 0.0231 8.66    <.0001 
Error Correction (β3 + β4) -0.784333       
    Error Correction at Δ (β3) -1.30304 0.1319 -9.88   <.0001 
    Error Correction at Δ2 (β4) 0.518707 0.2025 2.56 0.0122 
2006-2011 
Series Parameter estimate Std Error T-Stat P-Value 
Arbitrage Futures (β1) 0.926132 0.0323 28.65  <.0001 
Spot (β2) 0.073868 0.0323 2.29 0.0253 
Error Correction at Δ (β3) -0.4222 0.1126 -3.75 0.0004 
40 
 
The results also indicate that during the years 1996-2005 for WTI Crude Oil and 
1998-2011 for the Brent Crude Oil the ECM re-equilibrates at a significantly faster pace 
than the years 1986-1995 for WTI Crude Oil and 2006-2011 for WTI Crude Oil.  The 
majority of these time periods are I(2) for both WTI and Brent Crude Oil, with the 
exception being 2006-2011 for Brent Crude Oil.16   From these findings we believe that 
there is a correlation between the order of integration of our time series data and the 
speed at which our ECM re-equilibrates. 
The results from Table 6 and Table 7 show consistently through time and across 
both WIT and Brent Crude Oil that arbitrage is responsible for the majority of short-term 
changes in crude oil prices.  The results from time period 1986-1990 for WTI Crude are 
consistent with Moosa’s results from 1995.17   The results from Table 6 and Table 7 also 
show that from 1996-2000 for WTI Crude Oil and 1998-2005 for Brent Crude Oil 
speculation had a significantly higher short-term effect on crude oil prices.  These sets of 
data suggest that speculation accounted for more than 20% of the short-term change in oil 
prices, which is significantly higher than the 13% average across both WTI and Brent.   
Recent controversy over oil speculation suggests that these higher percentages for 
effects of speculation on crude oil prices are responsible for more volatile oil prices.  
                                                 
16 The Brent Crude Oil (2006-2011) residuals from the original OLS regression are tested for co-
integration and are only rejected with a p-value of 0.0581 (Table 1).  This is a weak rejection of H0: No Co-
integration.  We also see that the error correction parameter is significantly smaller than the other error 
correction parameters for I(2) data, but also significantly larger than the error correction parameters for data 
I(1) (Table 7). 
17 Moosa (1995 pp.182). Moosa found that WTI Crude Oil prices during the years 1986-1991 were 
controlled mainly by arbitrage.  His results conclude that arbitrage accounted for more than 90% of the 
change in crude oil prices and speculation accounted for less than 10%. 
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However, oil prices have been most volatile from 2006-2011 and our results show that 
the short-term effects of oil speculation have been at their lowest during 2006-2011 at 
5.5% for WTI and 7.3% for Brent crude oil.  The claim that oil speculation is causing 
extremely volatile oil prices would infer that speculation should have a higher percentage 
accounting for oil prices during 2006-2011.  Our research does not support the claim that 
oil speculation has been responsible for more volatile crude oil prices.  It can be argued 
that there is more oil speculation today than 20 years ago, but the proportion of short-
term change in oil prices that speculators are responsible for today are much lower than 
in years past. 
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CONCLUSION 
Significance of Results 
POLICY MAKING 
This study is of particular interest to government agencies, political parties, the 
financial industry, the energy industry, and the American consumer.  The topic of 
regulating Wall Street, big oil, and speculation in the derivative markets has been an 
important issue ever since the great recession of 2008.  All these topics are covered in 
Dodd-Frank, the most significant change in the American financial regulatory 
environment since the Great Depression of 1929.18  Dodd-Frank affects all federal 
financial regulatory agencies and almost every aspect of the nation's financial services 
industry.  There has been criticism of Dodd-Frank from both sides of the political 
spectrum.  Those in favor of government regulation argue that the reforms of Dodd-Frank 
are inadequate and do not have the power to prevent another financial crisis or any 
additional Wall Street bailouts.  On the other side, those against government regulation 
argue that the reforms went too far and are restricting banks’ and other financial 
institutions’ ability to operate.  Our study hopes to provide some insight into oil 
speculation for policy makers in Washington. 
                                                 
18 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173) is a 
federal statute in the United States that was signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010. 
The Act implements financial regulatory reform sponsored by the Democratically controlled 111th United 
States Congress and the Obama administration. 
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Government Regulators 
Those in favor of more government intervention on oil speculation argue that one 
of the biggest threats to a complete economic recovery from the great recession is the 
price of oil.  The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has 
stated that a rise in oil and commodities prices will almost certainly constrain demand, 
which is vital to a recovering economy. This is because commodities and oil are bare 
necessities for an economy and economic theory states that increases in commodity 
prices result in less consumer disposable income and inflation, both of which result in 
less consumer demand.  It has also been noted in a conversation between George Soros19 
and CFTC staffer, Michael Greenberger, that the fundamentals of supply and demand 
could not have accounted for the sharp rise in prices during the first six months of 2008.20  
It is clear that economic liberals are concerned about the recent volatility in crude oil 
prices and believe that the volatility is a result of oil speculation.  While it is evident that 
in the past couple of years, the crude oil market has seen the highest amount of volatility 
since oil futures were widely and openly traded on exchanges, our results indicate that oil 
speculation is not responsible for the volatility.21  In fact our results indicate that the 
effect of oil speculation on crude oil prices is at its lowest, percentage-wise, since oil 
                                                 
19 George Soros is a Hungarian-American businessman who supports progressive-liberal causes.  He is the 
chairman of Soros Fund Management and also known as "The Man Who Broke the Bank of England," 
because of his billion dollar investment profit during the 1992 Black Wednesday U.K. currency crisis. 
20 See Hayes and Murphy (March 2011).  During the first six months of 2008, the United States economic 
output was declining while global supply was increasing, and even if supply and demand were pushing the 
price of oil up, over the long run, that alone could not explain the massive market volatility. 
21 Stein (1986, pp.7). Out of all the contracts introduced by U.S. exchanges between 1960 and 1977, only 
32% traded in 1980.  However, this quickly changed when the New York Futures Exchange opened in 
1980 and futures trading became more popular. 
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futures were openly traded on exchanges.  Our results also indicate that arbitragers have 
taken on a much larger role, percentage-wise, in effecting crude oil prices during 2006-
2011.   
Financial and Energy Industries 
As previously mentioned, the financial and energy industries are affected greatly 
by regulations placed on oil speculation.  These regulations reduce the flow of business in 
these industries and lead to less leverage and productivity.  The costs associated with 
regulations causing less business activities not only affect financial and energy industries, 
but get passed along to the American consumer.  The regulations in Dodd-Frank 
regulating oil speculation have shrunk corporate profits, which has led to downsizing and 
higher prices of oil and financial products.  It has been argued that the regulations from 
Dodd-Frank are in fact responsible for the surge and volatility in crude oil prices along 
with the slow recovering economy, because without oil speculation crude oil futures 
markets become more illiquid.  Oil speculators make up a large percentage of participants 
in the futures market and without speculators there are much fewer market participants 
willing to bear the risk that traders (hedgers) wish to offset.  This leads to less liquidity in 
futures markets, which has an adverse effect on the economy. 
The financial and energy industries could use the findings of this paper to fight 
government regulations on oil speculation.  Hypothetically, if oil speculation were indeed 
responsible for the recent volatile crude oil prices, then the benefits could be weighed 
against the costs of increased government regulation of oil speculation.  However, our 
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results indicate oil speculation is not responsible for the volatile crude oil prices and 
therefore support the financial industry, energy industry, and economically conservative 
politicians. 
Model Reliability  
STRENGTHS OF THE MODEL 
The strengths of the model stem from its ability to transform non-stationary time 
series data into stationary time series data that can be properly analyzed.  A basic form of 
this model was first used to examine the roles of arbitrage and speculation in the forward 
exchange markets with fixed and flexible rates.22  This model was then further developed 
and extended to oil futures and spot prices.  Since then, there have been many analyses on 
the effects of arbitrage and speculation in the crude oil futures market.23  
Model Validation 
To check the validity of our model, we perform an out-of-sample validation on 
the analyzed time periods of data for WTI and Brent Crude Oil.  Equations Eq. 17 and 
Eq. 18 are used to perform the out-of-sample validation. 
  Eq. 17 
 Eq. 18 
                                                 
22 Prior contributors include, but are not limited to, Stoll, Stein, McCallum, Moosa, Officer, Willett, and 
Tsiang. 
23 Moosa (1995 pp.184). Moosa performs his study on West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil over the period 
of January 1986 through December 1991. 
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The equations take the estimated values for the changes in crude oil futures prices and 
add them to the current futures price to forecast the futures price in the next month.   For 
each five year period we use the appropriate ECM along with the last two months of data 
to forecast the crude oil price for the next five months.  By comparing the estimates from 
our model with the actual crude oil prices, we confirm that our model is satisfactory.  The 
results in Table 8 show that our model produces out-of-sample estimates that are, for the 
most part, consistent with the actual futures prices.  The difference between the out-of-
sample estimates and actual prices tends to get larger as more time passes.  This is a 
result of each out-of-sample estimate depending on the estimate in the period preceding 
it. 
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Table 8: Out-of-Sample Validation 
 
WTI Crude Oil 
 
Brent Crude Oil 
 
 
1986-1990 
 
1986-1990 
 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
 
Jan-1991 22.77 23.28 
 
Jan-1991 N/A N/A 
 
 
Feb-1991 18.81 19.08 
 
Feb-1991 N/A N/A 
 
 
Mar-1991 19.17 18.39 
 
Mar-1991 N/A N/A 
 
 
Apr-1991 20.30 19.61 
 
Apr-1991 N/A N/A 
 
 
May-1991 21.19 20.25 
 
May-1991 N/A N/A 
 
 
1991-1995 
 
1991-1995 
 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
 
Jan-1996 18.00 18.44 
 
Jan-1996 N/A N/A 
 
 
Feb-1996 17.80 18.66 
 
Feb-1996 N/A N/A 
 
 
Mar-1996 18.92 20.60 
 
Mar-1996 N/A N/A 
 
 
Apr-1996 19.99 22.96 
 
Apr-1996 N/A N/A 
 
 
May-1996 19.39 20.69 
 
May-1996 N/A N/A 
 
 
1996-2000 
 
1996-2000 
 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
 
Jan-2001 27.46 28.63 
 
Jan-2001 N/A N/A 
 
 
Feb-2001 28.91 28.24 
 
Feb-2001 N/A N/A 
 
 
Mar-2001 27.4 30.35 
 
Mar-2001 N/A N/A 
 
 
Apr-2001 28.08 33.78 
 
Apr-2001 N/A N/A 
 
 
May-2001 29.13 33.27 
 
May-2001 N/A N/A 
 
 
2001-2005 
 
1998-2005 
 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
 
Jan-2006 66.68 57.35 
 
Jan-2006 65.17 64.01 
 
 
Feb-2006 64.04 57.06 
 
Feb-2006 63.99 58.08 
 
 
Mar-2006 65.3 64.17 
 
Mar-2006 65.95 47.67 
 
 
Apr-2006 72.43 64.13 
 
Apr-2006 71.83 68.15 
 
 
May-2006 72.88 62.14 
 
May-2006 71.51 48.05 
 
 
2006-2011 
 
2006-2011 
 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
Month Actual Prices Validation Prices 
 
 
Jan-2011 92.2 96.00 
 
Jan-2011 97.18 96.58 
 
 
Feb-2011 94.7 97.27 
 
Feb-2011 106.50 100.88 
 
 
Mar-2011 104.47 97.72 
 
Mar-2011 115.79 110.25 
 
 
Apr-2011 111.01 111.94 
 
Apr-2011 116.49 118.06 
 
 
May-2011 102.26 119.98 
 
May-2011 111.73 112.98 
 
 
Value Added to Original Model 
This paper expands on Moosa’s initial study by analyzing not only WTI Crude 
Oil, but Brent Crude Oil as well.  This paper also examines WTI and Brent Crude Oil 
over a larger span of time with more time periods.  By analyzing different types of crude 
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oil over multiple windows of time, it was discovered that the simple first difference ECM 
was not applicable to all the sets of data.  The original data set analyzed by Moosa was 
I(1).  However, our data from different time periods were not all I(1).  There were many 
sets of data that were I(2) and could not be modeled using the original ECM.  We further 
developed the ECM by applying it to series data that were I(2) with another 
transformation, which led to the analysis of the second difference of those series data. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE MODEL 
Although the restrictions on the model have passed our tests, the model could 
benefit by specifying a more direct test of the restrictions, β1 > 0 and β2 > 0.  While co-
integration was indicated on our data at either I(1) or I(2) by rejecting H0: No co-
integration, H0 was not rejected with our smaller time frames of five years.   
Finally, the data used for WTI and Brent Crude Oil were integrated at different 
orders, I(1) and I(2), for different time periods.  The model would be stronger if the cause 
of the different orders of integration could be explained.  Perhaps the different orders of 
integration are of significance and have an effect on the results. 
Further Research 
Further research could include the extension of our model to other types of Crude 
Oil and their respective futures markets that they trade on.  Our model could be applied to 
the Russian Export Blend found in Eastern European markets and the OPEC Basket 
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found in Middle Eastern and Asian Markets.24   It would also be interesting to see if this 
same model and concept can be applied to other commodities.  Comparing the recent oil 
price bubble with other commodity bubbles occurring after the great recession of 2008 
could provide vital information about our current economic landscape.  For example, 
gold and precious metals have had volatile prices over the last five years, which poses the 
question: Are gold and precious metal prices being driven by the laws of supply and 
demand or are metal futures behind the creation of a speculative bubble?  The same can 
be asked about livestock and their futures prices as a result of recent droughts.25   
With the limited data on crude oil futures before the 1980s, a study comparing the 
volatility of crude oil price during the oil crisis of the 1970s with the oil crisis now could 
provide more insight on today’s crude oil prices.26   Perhaps there are similar causes, 
other than oil speculation, for the 1970s oil crisis and our current oil crisis. 
  
                                                 
24 The OPEC basket includes the Dubai Crude blend and Oman Crude blend, which are both sold in The 
United Arab Emirates with their futures traded on the Dubai Mercantile Exchange. 
25 The price of livestock futures on the NYMEX have been rising recently as a result of the droughts in the 
Southwest United States, especially in Texas. 
26 Stein (1986, pp.7).  Crude oil futures were not widely and openly traded on exchanges until the 1980s.  
Therefore, data on oil futures prices before 1980 are not consistently documented or available. 
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